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1. Introduction  
When in 1947, the Indian subcontinent was partitioned into the Hindu-majority Republic of India 
(India) and the Muslim-majority Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Pakistan), communities that had 
coexisted for centuries attacked one another (Dalrymple 2015; Sagan and Waltz 2015, 136). In this 
gruesome outbreak of sectarian violence between 200.000 and 500.000 people lost their lives (Ibid.). 
The Indo-Pakistani conflict, which continues until today, has seen three declared wars, one undeclared 
war, many border skirmishes and military stand-offs (Paul 2005, 8). The conflict often erupted in the 
Himalayan region of Kashmir, which territory is claimed by both nations (Ibid. 9-10).  
Several scholars (e.g. Ganguly and Kapur 2009; Kapur 2007; Sagan and Waltz 2015) attribute 
these conflicts to the effects of both nations’ possession of nuclear weapons. Explanations for why 
such nuclear weapons states tend (not) to wage war against each other, often function as the basis of 
classical deterrence theory. This theory entails that when a threat to use nuclear weapons is credible, 
it will deter a threatening nation from attacking a threatened nation (Sagan and Waltz 2015). However, 
armed conflict between India and Pakistan has taken place both before and after both nations 
developed nuclear weapons. Therefore, nuclear weapons can thus not explain conflict occurrence.  
Although often used to explain conflict occurrence between India and Pakistan, deterrence 
theory is then also unable to explain the enduring Indo-Pakistani conflict, which is problematic. By 
leaving out nuclear deterrence theory in explaining the Indo-Pakistani situation, and by identifying 
other factors to explain Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence, I aim to fill a scientific niche. A broader 
understanding of Indo-Pakistani circumstances – not just in light of nuclear deterrence – can provide 
policymakers both nationally and internationally with a solid basis for their responses. For years, 
Western policymakers and decisionmakers have focused on nuclear nonproliferation and 
disarmament in South Asia as a means of ameliorating the Indo-Pakistani conflict (e.g. Joshi, O’Donnell 
and Pant 2016). Showing that other factors are operating between India and Pakistan can drive 
refinements in policymakers’ understanding of the Indian subcontinent. A better understanding 
amongst stakeholders about the nature of the South Asian situation could consequently create a more 
peaceful state of affairs. Such actors can then create other, perhaps even more effective measures, 
that are not rooted in nonproliferation, to counter the ever-persisting tensions between India and 
Pakistan.  
In this thesis, I will answer the following research question: Which factors explain conflict 
occurrence between India and Pakistan beyond deterrence theory? In order to answer this question, I 
will first analyze classical deterrence theory and its use to explain conflict occurrence between India 
and Pakistan, including the limitations of this theory. Subsequently, I will investigate alternative, non-
nuclear, general conflict occurrence factors/theories. I will conduct a controlled comparison to 
establish which of these non-nuclear factors can explain conflict occurrence between India and 
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Pakistan. I will analyze four selected instances of conflict occurrence between India and Pakistan, two 
in the pre-nuclear era and two in the post-nuclear era. After the analysis section, a discussion and 
summary of findings will follow, together with recommendations for future research. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1 Classical deterrence theory 
Rooted in the realist school of international relations, classical deterrence theory was developed to 
analyze the relationship between nuclear weapons and conflict occurrence (Zagare and Kilgour 2000, 
7). In the anarchic world system without an overarching authority, states are driven by their nature to 
maximize power or by their environment to maximize security (Milner 1991; Morgenthau 1948; and, 
Waltz 1979). Here, a balance of power is the most efficient mechanism for maintaining order (e.g. 
Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1993). Classical deterrence theorists see the key to international stability in 
a balance of (nuclear) power, especially in bipolar structures (Zagare and Kilgour 2000, 8).  
In classical deterrence theory, nuclear deterrence can generally be defined as a threat of using 
nuclear force to coerce a potential attacking nation not to undertake aggressive action (Gerson 2009, 
34). This is achieved by making the costs of such an aggressive action unacceptably high or the 
probability of success extremely low (Ibid.). The effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is linked to the 
conviction of potential attackers that their military aggression will be met with retaliation (Ibid.). 
Crucially, deterrence contains both ability and credibility (Huth, Gelpi and Bennett 1993, 612). This is 
because a deterring state must have nuclear weapons capabilities to substantiate its threat, but also 
have the will to execute the nuclear threat when needed (Ibid.)  
When applying classical deterrence theory to the Indo-Pakistani situation, two different 
schools of thought can be distinguished: (1) those scholars who posit that India and Pakistan’s 
possession of nuclear weapons has by and large prevented conflict; and, (2) those scholars who 
indicate that it has increased conflict in the past and that it will make conflict more probable in the 
future (Sagan and Waltz 2015). These contrasting views are best illustrated by Sagan and Waltz’ (2015) 
debate on the effects of the spread of nuclear weapons to South Asia. 
 On the one hand (1), in line with classical deterrence theory, Waltz has been a proponent of 
the school arguing that the spread of nuclear weapons would prevent conflict (Sagan and Waltz 2015, 
1-46). In his reasoning, because India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, the risk of preemptive war 
and interstate conflict between the two is reduced (Ibid.). In Waltz’ argument, India has rightly 
developed nuclear weapons to secure itself against its nuclear-armed neighbor, the People’s Republic 
of China (China) (Ibid. 159-61). After this development, Pakistan needed to acquire nuclear weapons 
of its own (Ibid.). He also argues that nuclear weapons empirically show to make conventionally 
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dangerous and unstable situations to be safer and more stable (Ibid. 162-3). This is shown, he reasons, 
in the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan, where nuclear weapons prevented major interstate 
war from breaking out (Ibid.). Importantly, nuclear weapons make crises more stable, which is the 
reason to believe that India and Pakistan are better off with nuclear weapons than without them (Ibid. 
170).  
 At the other hand (2), however, Sagan is pessimistic (Sagan and Waltz 2015, 47-93). He argues 
that India and Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons will not inhibit war and conflict (Ibid. 138-56). 
As the mindsets of the Pakistani militarized regime vis-à-vis India’s civilian controlled state are 
different, preventive war between the two nations over the years has been a serious possibility (Ibid. 
140-6). At the same time, the Kashmir conflict has kept tensions high between India and Pakistan 
(Ibid.). This makes future nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan likely (Ibid.). According to Sagan, 
the 1999 Kargil War is disturbing, as it shows that nuclear-armed states can fight wars – disproving 
Waltz’ (1981) conception that they do not – making future conflict in South Asia more likely (Ibid. 144-
5).  
When trying to explain conflict occurrence between India and Pakistan with classical 
deterrence theory, opposing interpretations of the situation are found as shown above. This urges the 
need to investigate conflict occurrence beyond deterrence theory, also since armed conflict has been 
present between India and Pakistan both before and after they developed nuclear weapons. Therefore 
this thesis will proceed by taking out nuclear weapons as a factor in explaining Indo-Pakistani conflict 
occurrence. Henceforth, I will be looking into other, non-nuclear, explanations of conflict occurrence.  
 
2.2 Theoretical argument: non-nuclear conflict occurrence factors and theories 
When describing non-nuclear explanations of conflict occurrence, Ganguly (2001, 4-8) and Paul (2005, 
21) have used both international relations paradigms (e.g. Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann 2004), that draw 
on systemic level explanations, and area specialist approaches (e.g. Bose 1999), that offer idiosyncratic 
variables (Paul 2005, 251). Although often seen as distinct fields of research, a combination between 
these could form a good basis to explain multifaceted conflicts like the Indo-Pakistani conflict (Ibid.). 
Therefore, I have combined Ganguly’s (2001, 4-8) aggregate level analysis with Paul’s (2005, 21) more 
exhaustive, fine-grained, list of conflict occurrence factors, to establish which factors could be relevant 
in explaining Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence. Where Paul (2005, 21) lists a number of factors 
without describing the mechanism of their interaction, Ganguly (2001, 4-8) outlines the mechanism 
between them without explicitly listing the singular factors at play. To bridge both authors’ arguments, 
I have modified these factors into: (I) incompatible national identities; (II) irredentism; (III) particular 
power asymmetry; (IV) domestic power structures; and (V) great power involvement. With these 
factors, I hope to cover the most important causes at play. These five factors are elaborated below and 
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will be used as a hypothesis in this thesis for explaining conflict occurrence between India and Pakistan 
over time. 
 
2.2.1 Incompatible national identities 
Scholars (e.g. Anderson 1983; Hutchinson 2017; Van Evera 1994; Wimmer 2012) note that 
incompatible national identities can be significant factors in explaining conflict occurrence between 
states. Anderson (1983), for instance, argues that national identities are a way of imagining and 
creating communities. Nevertheless, these identities are fictional and invoked by political leaders in 
order to precipitate a desired political response (Ibid.). The links between states with strong such 
national identities and war are noteworthy (Van Evera 1994, 5). Hutchinson (2017, 2-3) attests that 
nationalism can be a threat to a stable world order because nationalist irredentist claims remain a 
problem to international stability (Ibid.). Besides, Wimmer (2012, 4) states that new nations, that just 
have shifted to nationalism to legitimize political power, are a major cause of war in modern times. 
Nationalist identities can ideologically too be driven by religion, where it provides the identity that 
makes a community cohere and links it with a particular territory (Juergensmeyer 1996, 4-5). In such 
cases, nationalism can also be targeting other religions as a means of unifying a people (Ibid. 13-5). 
 Generally, the more divergent the national identities of two nations, with different perceptions 
about their mutual history and their current conduct and character, the greater the risk of war (Van 
Evera 1994, 9). This happens as divergent national identities often result in chauvinist mythmaking, 
which is the creation of myths by decisionmakers that often serve purposes as self-glorifying, self-
whitewashing, and other-maligning (Kapur 1991, 16-7; Van Evera 1994, 26-33). Chauvinist mythmaking 
can create conflict-spirals leading to war (Ibid.). In such conflict-spirals, a nation responds hostile 
towards others’ legitimate claims, hoping that the claimant will back down (Ibid.). In turn, the targeted 
nation will take this as further evidence of the other nation’s inherent cruelty and injustice, creating a 
vicious circle leading to conflict (Ibid.). The purpose of chauvinist mythmaking is to create group or 
national cohesiveness, to bind governmental institutions with the people, and to serve as a basis for 
policy and social action (Kapur 1991, 16-7). Nationalist mythmaking can be clearly present in textbooks 
of such nations (Shin and Sneider 2011, 6-10).  
 
2.2.2 Irredentism 
Saideman and Ayres (2000, 1126) indicate that irredentism has been an important cause of 
international conflict. Irredentism is a political movement, often advocated by nationalists, that aims 
to unite the territory of an ethnic group with the territories of other segments (Ibid). Irredentism is 
inherently risky compared to other foreign policies because making territorial demands upon a 
neighbor is tantamount to inviting war (Saideman 2005, 208-11). However, although irredentist 
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behavior can have harmful consequences for nations, domestic policies can induce irredentism (Ibid.). 
Politicians that are competing for support of a population that has kin in the territory to be redeemed, 
are more likely to support irredentist policies; even if it will hurt the country on whole (Ibid.). Similarly, 
Van Evera (1994, 20) argues that situations in which the rescue of diasporas by homelands is difficult 
but possible, have a greater risk of war. In such scenarios, homelands will seize any windows of 
opportunity that arise – often resulting in conflict – to reunite its foreign kin (Ibid.).  
 
2.2.3 Particular power asymmetry 
A number of scholars (e.g. Zinnes 1961; Mack 1975; Bueno de Mesquita 1981; and, Arreguín-Toft 2001) 
have written on asymmetric conflicts. Asymmetric conflicts involve states that have unequal power 
capabilities (Paul 2005, 5). Bueno de Mesquita (1981, 182-3) argues that weaker states can initiate 
conflict in their pursuit of maximizing expected utility. In other words, when weaker states have a 
reasonable expectation of success against a more powerful foe, they can initiate wars (Ibid.). 
Elaborating on this, Paul (1994) states that conflict occurrence can be explained by particular power 
asymmetry between nations. He contends that weaker states can initiate conflict if its key decision-
makers believe they can achieve their political and military objectives (Ibid. 16-35). According to him, 
this belief can ensue when (a combination of) four conditions are in place: (1) when a limited aims 
strategy could award the weaker state with gains to the status quo; (2) when short-term capabilities 
cause windows of opportunity to be exploited; (3) when great power ally support is favorable; and, (4) 
when domestic power structures are changing (Ibid. 20).  
 
2.2.4 Domestic power structures 
Tremblay and Schofield (2005, 227) indicate that military and hybrid regimes behave more 
aggressively and war-prone than more democratic ones. Here, hybrid regimes are regimes that 
combine democratic and autocratic traits, consisting of civilian and military interest groups (Ibid. 
229). Tremblay and Schofield (2005, 225) delineate the following mechanism. Military regimes create 
structural and normative distortions in decision-making (Ibid. 226). This causes that military regimes 
become involved in strategic disputes more often than civilian ones; while they also escalate disputes 
more rapidly (Ibid.). Hybrid regimes have an even greater tendency than military ones to pursue 
confrontational policies (Ibid.). This is because – contrary to military regimes – they are not insulated 
from volatile popular issues (Ibid.). Hybrid regimes even seek popular legitimacy through disputes, 
while they rely on the generation of regime-legitimizing myths for their survival (Ibid.). This explains 
military and hybrid regimes’ increased propensity to conflict.  
 Conversely, Tremblay and Schofield (2005, 237) argue that democratic states are less war-
prone due to domestic crosscutting cleavages that make aggressive unilateral policy difficult to 
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implement. In a democracy, foreign policy decisionmaking is affected by its institutional constraints, 
causing that normative biases are not that easily created (Ibid.). This has a mitigating effect on 
foreign policy. Moreover, civilian control over the military in democratic states means that defense 
policy receives lower priority (Ibid.).  
Complementary, Mansfield and Snyder (2005, 1-19) attest that contrary to fully established 
democracies, new democracies are often more unstable and more war-prone. This happens because 
such states go through a rocky transitional period, where democratic control over foreign policy is 
partial, where mass politics mixes in a volatile way with authoritarian elite politics, and where 
democratization suffers reversal (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 5). Without democracy’s mitigating 
institutions strongly in place, politicians resort to bellicose nationalism to empower the people (Ibid. 
2005, 2).  
 
2.2.5 Great power involvement 
Lastly, Kober (2006, 21) has linked conflict occurrence with great power involvement in two ways. First, 
great powers get involved in regional disputes to balance power (Levy 2004, 30-5). Balance-of-power 
theory entails that on the international stage states act to regulate disputes by forming a coalition 
against any state that threatens to gain a position of (regional) hegemony (Ibid. 35-6). In bipolar 
systems, great-power competitive balancing is extended to peripheral regions (Kober 2006, 20). 
Second, the patron-client theory focuses on the vertical great power–local actor relationship, 
considering the informal relations between unequal partners (Ibid. 22). At the onset of war between 
local actors, great powers might try to influence their adversaries’ capabilities in war (Ibid. 22). For 
military action poses risks and costs for patrons, they normally prefer to support a client through arms 
and logistical support (Ibid. 23). Therefore, when great powers get involved in a regional conflict, 
military capabilities of (one of) the warring factions are often enhanced, increasing the risk of conflict 
(Ibid.). 
 
3. Case Selection:  
I will conduct a qualitative controlled comparison to establish which above-described factors might 
explain conflict occurrence between India and Pakistan. According to Slater and Ziblatt (2013), a 
controlled comparison design combines multiple methods to tests hypotheses in cases that are similar 
or identical except for the independent variable(s). In doing so, it can clarify empirical convergences 
and divergences (Ibid. 1301). Sharing this goal, I will use this design for this research.  
India and Pakistan have been selected as they harbor one of the longest enduring conflicts of 
the 20th and 21st centuries (Paul 2005, 3). Conflicts have occurred both before and after India and 
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Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons1. Relating Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence to their 
possession of nuclear weapons cannot convincingly be corroborated by empirical evidence, as 
opposing interpretations of the situation by Sagan and Waltz (2015) in paragraph 2.1 show. Two 
conflicts have been selected as cases in the pre-nuclear era (t1 = independence until the late 1980s), 
and two conflicts as cases in the nuclear era (t2 = the late 1980 until the present) (Khan 2005, 160; 
Leng 2005, 121-2; Paul 2005, 8). These conflicts can be seen as diverse cases spanning the pre-
nuclear and the nuclear era with the objective of achieving maximum variance along relevant 
dimensions (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 300-1). These cases are intended to represent the full 
range of values characterizing the relationship between the various factors and Indo-Pakistani 
conflict occurrence with the aim to test the hypothesis (Ibid. 300). The cases that I will look into are: 
• Conflict 1: the 1947-8 Indo-Pakistani armed conflict (t1); 
• Conflict 2: the 1965 Indo-Pakistani armed conflict (t1); 
• Conflict 3: the 1999 Indo-Pakistani armed conflict (t2); 
• Conflict 4: the 2001-2 Indo-Pakistani armed conflict (t2) (Paul 2005, 8); 
My research design is summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence 
 T1 (1947 – late 1980s) T2 (late 1980s – present) 
 Conflict 1 
(1947-8) 
Conflict 2 
(1965) 
Conflict 3 
(1999) 
Conflict 4 
(2001-2) 
X1: Incompatible national identities - - - - 
X2: Irredentism - - - - 
X3: Particular power asymmetry -  - - - 
X4: Domestic power structures - - - - 
X5: Great power involvement - - - - 
Ydependent: Conflict occurrence Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Conflict characteristics (initiator; type) - - - - 
 
Moreover, this controlled comparison uses an explaining outcome process-tracing research 
method, aiming to sufficiently explain conflict occurrence (Beach and Pederson 2013, 11). In order to 
reach this goal, a deductive path will be followed in which first a theory has been conceptualized into 
                                                          
1 Both nations are regarded to have gained the capability to test and deploy nuclear arms by the late 1980s 
(Khan 2005, 160). 
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a causal mechanism (Ibid. 19). This causal mechanism will be evaluated against the empirical record, 
where after an assessment will be made whether or not a sufficient explanation has been crafted 
(Ibid.).  
 
4. Analysis 
This chapter analyzes the contribution of chosen conflict occurrence factors in explaining the selected 
conflicts. Under header ‘Overall state of hostility’, the factors (I) incompatible national identities, and 
(II) irredentism are covered. I ascertain that these factors are drivers for Indo-Pakistani conflict, as they 
are root causes explaining the overall state of hostility between India and Pakistan. I should note that 
factor (II) irredentism is an extreme expression of factor (I) incompatible national identities. However, 
it is such an important materialization, comprising a core element in the Indo-Pakistani conflict, I will 
discuss it separately. Furthermore, under the header ‘False optimism’, the factors (III) particular power 
asymmetry, (IV) domestic power structures, and, (V) great power involvement are included. I posit that 
these factors are enablers of Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence. So, when (a combination of) these 
enabling factors changes, Indo-Pakistani conflict is induced. I should mention that factor (III) partly 
overlaps with the factors (IV) and (V), in the sense that factor (IV) overlaps with condition (4) of factor 
(III), and that factor (V) overlaps with condition (3) of factor (III). Nevertheless, as they have distinctly 
been listed by Paul (2005, 21), I have chosen to review them separately. 
 
4.1 1947-8 conflict 
4.1.1 Conflict explanation 
After the Indian subcontinent was divided on the basis of demographics into Hindu-majority India and 
Muslim-majority Pakistan in 1947, conflict broke out between both nations on the territory of the 
independent State of Kashmir (Ganguly 2001, 15). Trying to add Muslim-majority Kashmir into its 
nation, aiding a tribal Kashmiri rebellion, Pakistan invaded the area (Ibid. 16-7). In response, Kashmir’s 
Hindu-ruler decided to accede to India and to appeal for its military assistance (Ibid.). Indian military 
forces managed to halt the Pakistani attack and a subsequent ceasefire line, called the Line of Control 
(LoC), was created, dividing Kashmir into two (Ibid.). Next, India transferred the resolution of the 
Kashmir issue to the United Nations (UN) Security Council, where a new battlefield opened up (Korbel 
1954, 165-98). 
 
4.1.2 Which factors caused the 1947-8 conflict? 
Regarding the disarray of Pakistan’s political and military structures after partition, at first glance, it is 
hard to understand why Pakistan could have believed that war with India over Kashmir could lead to a 
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Pakistani victory (Jalal 1990, 25-48; Ganguly 2001, 19). In trying to answer what caused this conflict, I 
will analyze whether the five hypothesized factors can explain the 1947-8 conflict between India and 
Pakistan. 
 
Overall state of hostility 
Incompatible national identities. At the onset of the 1947-8 conflict, the overall state of hostility 
between India and Pakistan can be explained by the incompatible Indo-Pakistani identities. Foremost, 
the Partition of India, preceding the 1947-8 conflict, was caused by fundamentally different views on 
the future of the Indian subcontinent (Ganguly 2001, 4-5; Khan 2017). The founding principle of secular 
India declares that Hindus and Muslims are two intertwined communities which should live in one 
country (Zakaria 2004). In contrast, the founding principle of religious Pakistan claims that Muslims are 
different from Hindus, and thus comprise two nations (Khan 1950). Because of these contrasting views, 
the two emerging states were already locked into a potential collision course after the demise of British 
rule (Ganguly 2001, 10). This resulted in the fact that Pakistan, seeing itself as the homeland for 
Muslims on the Indian subcontinent, sought to incorporate the Muslim-majority state of Kashmir (Ibid. 
5). At the same time, as it wanted to demonstrate that all communities could thrive in its secular state, 
India sought to thwart Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir (Ibid.).  
At the time of the 1947-8 conflict, Pakistani leaders were inexperienced, weak and lacked a 
vision for the future (Kapur 1991, 11). Therefore, they were unable to develop a Pakistani nationalism 
or identity other than one based on negative anti-Indianism (Ibid.). Although in 1947, Pakistan’s 
founder, Governor-General Jinnah, acknowledged that domestic issues were the primary problems for 
Pakistan, he chose instead to concentrate on anti-Indianism to minimize internal political pressures 
(Ibid. 17; Jalal 1985, 50). This is reflected in the use of images of ‘us versus them’ by the Pakistani 
leadership (Kapur 1991, 17). These images portray the Hindu-Muslim religious divide to be the basis of 
the India-Pakistan rivalry (Ibid.). One of such self-glorifying sentiments has been captured by Pakistani 
Major-General Khan’s account of the war: ‘In the remotest of our villages, the humblest of our people 
possess a self-confidence and ready willingness to march forward into India – a spirit the equivalent of 
which cannot be found on the other side. It may take many generations to create such a spirit’ (Khan 
1970, 191). While another, anti-Indian image was uttered by Governor-General Jinnah in 1946, 
commenting on the dangers of an Indian empire: ‘If a Hindu empire is achieved, it will mean the end 
of Islam in India, and even in other Muslim countries’ (Biswas 2009). 
Irredentism. Pakistan’s nationalist identity based on religion, encouraged by its anti-Indian 
images, urged it to try to add Muslim-majority Kashmir into its nation (Ganguly 2001, 5). For this 
reason, Pakistan initiated armed conflict (Ibid.). This shows irredentist Pakistani desires, increasing the 
overall state of hostility between the two nations. Crucially, during UN negotiations after the war, 
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Pakistan explained that it had intervened in Kashmir to protect ‘its own population’ from Indian 
aggression, questioning the legality of Kashmir’s accession to India (Ganguly 2001, 20). Pakistan’s 
irredentist desire is further substantiated by a statement of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Khan, 
commenting on the need for war with India on Kashmir in 1947: ‘If, God forbid, the Pakistan 
Government or the Muslim League do not act [to gain Kashmir], Kashmir might be lost to them’ 
(Raghavan 2010, 103). After the 1947-8 Kashmir conflict, showing irredentist yearnings, Governor-
General Jinnah was stated to have said: ‘Kashmir is the Jugular vein of Pakistan and no nation or 
country would tolerate its Jugular vein remains under the sword of the enemy’ (Kashmir Information 
and Research Center 2017). As a result, since this war, Pakistan has provided its full support to 
irredentist and secessionist movements in Kashmir, ranging from verbal encouragement to all-out war 
(Saideman 2005, 218).  
 
False optimism 
Particular power asymmetry. Next to the two above-mentioned driving causes, Pakistan’s decision to 
use an opportunistic event – the tribal Kashmiri rebellion – to start war on Kashmir, was augmented 
by Pakistani false optimism. Particular power asymmetry between India and Pakistan has influenced 
this false optimism (Ganguly 2001, 7; Paul 1994; Paul 2005). In the 1947-8 conflict, although India 
enjoyed a military advantage of approximately 4:1 over Pakistan (see Figure 1), Pakistan nevertheless 
initiated war on Kashmir. Here, most conditions of Paul’s (1994, 20) theory of asymmetric conflicts 
were present.  
 
Figure 1 India to Pakistan capability ratios. Source: Diehl, Goertz and Sweedi (2005, 37). Note: 
Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) Ratio here is a measure of national power, 
representing represent demographic, economic, and military strength (Ibid.). Ind/Pak Military Ratio 
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here is the size of Indian military capabilities versus Pakistani military capabilities, measured in yearly 
military expenditure and number of military personnel in each state (Ibid.). 
 
First, Pakistan used a limited aims strategy by supporting Kashmiri rebels and initially acting 
covertly, hoping they would be able to deny their role in the events (Kiss 2013, 10). The aim of 
Pakistan’s limited aims strategy was to create an irreversible fait accompli before India could react, to 
change the status quo over Kashmir in their favor (Ibid.). Second, at that time, India’s military policy 
was to a great extent influenced by Gandhi and Nehru’s notion of nonviolence, that among other things 
propagated that India had no need for strategic defense plans or intelligence organizations (Ibid.). This 
resulted in a lack of sufficient investment in the military and intelligence organizations (Ibid.). Pakistan 
wanted to take advantage of this window of opportunity, that bridged the India-Pakistan power 
asymmetry, to change the state of affairs in Kashmir (Ibid.). Third, linking with factor (V) great power 
involvement, the 1947-8 conflict marks the beginning of the attempt by Pakistan’s Governor-General 
Jinnah to develop a Pakistan-United States (US) alliance against alleged India and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) (Kapur 1991, 24). The nascent Cold War offered Jinnah the chance to explore 
this alliance structure (Root 2008, 153). Thus far, it did not yet yield any favorable support, therefore 
this condition was not present (Kapur 1991, 24). Fourth, linking with factor (IV) domestic power 
structures, the Pakistani leadership hoped that a war on Kashmir would unite their new country against 
India, while at the same time it would increase regime legitimacy and popularity (Ibid.) This would 
unite the country domestically through foreign and military intervention (Ibid.).  
Domestic power structures. Domestic power structures can significantly explain the occurrence 
of the 1947-8 armed conflict. At that time, India and Pakistan’s political systems were similar, as both 
countries enjoyed civilian rule exempt from military pressures (Tremblay and Schofield 2005, 231). 
Nevertheless, Pakistan’s early democracy can be associated with war-proneness as described by 
Mansfield and Snyder (2005). After partition, Pakistan had neither a firm institutional democratic base 
nor a clear national identity (Ibid. 241-3). As these institutions proved inadequate to bind together 
Pakistan’s splintered society, its leaders resorted to using anti-Indian nationalism to establish a base 
of popular legitimacy (Ibid. 241-3). This caused Pakistan false optimism, and commence the war of 
1947 (Ibid.).  
Great power involvement. Additionally, great power involvement did not shape Pakistan’s 
decision to instigate the 1947-8 Indo-Pakistani conflict. Although Pakistan sought to correct the Indo-
Pakistani imbalance by searching for military assistance and support from the US, these efforts did not 
yet yield support (Thomas 2004, 311). Although the US started giving financial aid to Pakistan shortly 
after the country’s creation in 1947, not until 1955 did it start military assistance (Center for Global 
Development 2017). In the 1940s, the India-Pakistan conflict had low priority for the US, as it was not 
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yet interested in pushing the USSR from the region (Kapur 2005, 134). Therefore, the US used an 
evenhanded approach of mediation in the Kashmir dispute (Kapur 2005, 136). The USSR too was not 
yet interested in South Asia, neither supporting India and Pakistan in any significant way (Gupta 1981, 
219). Besides, China and Pakistan did not have a strong alliance relationship at that time yet (Paul 1994, 
118). Lastly, inspired by Nehru’s policies of nonviolence, India remained non-aligned to any major great 
powers at that time (Thomas 2004, 312). 
 
4.1.3 Conclusion 
Two driving factors indeed explain the root cause of the overall hostility between India and Pakistan 
at the onset of the 1947-8 conflict, which are (I) incompatible Indo-Pakistani identities and (II) Pakistani 
irredentist nationalism on Kashmir. Next to the two driving causes, Pakistan’s decision to wage war on 
Kashmir in 1947-8 was augmented by its false optimism. This false optimism was mainly fueled by the 
enabling factor (IV) domestic power structure, as Pakistan’s early democracy’s nationalist tendencies 
instigated Pakistan’s decisionmakers to go to war on Kashmir. Next to this, as most of Paul’s (1994) 
conditions were present, the enabling factor (III) particular power asymmetry between India and 
Pakistan, has also been of influence. This all led Pakistan to believe that war on Kashmir could be won. 
Lastly, the factor (V) great power involvement did not shape Pakistan’s false optimism. 
 
4.2 1965 conflict 
4.2.1 Conflict explanation 
Since the 1947-8 conflict, the question of Kashmir remained deadlocked in the UN, while Indo-
Pakistani talks on resolving the issue failed (Korbel 1954, 165-97; Ganguly 2001, 32-5). In order to 
change the status quo on Kashmir, in 1965, Pakistan embarked on Operation Gibraltar (Ibid. 43-6). 
Initially, Operation Gibraltar was designed to entail covert infiltration of Pakistani regular and 
irregular forces into Kashmir in order to provoke a Kashmiri rebellion (Ibid.). However, Indian forces 
quickly became aware of the intruders, and various major battles ensued around the LoC and in the 
Punjab. By mid-September, the war was reaching a stalemate, and a UN-brokered ceasefire 
resolution entered into force, ending this outbreak of hostilities (Ibid.).  
 
4.2.2 Which factors caused the 1965 conflict? 
Similar to the 1947-8 conflict, as the Pakistani leadership was aware of their disadvantaged position 
vis-à-vis India, its decision to resort to war against India in 1965 is an interesting puzzle (Ganguly 
2001, 40). In trying to answer what caused this conflict, I will analyze whether the five hypothesized 
factors can explain this conflict occurrence between India and Pakistan. 
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Overall state of hostility 
Incompatible national identities. The 1965 conflict has its roots in the incompatible Indo-Pakistani 
identities. During the mid-1960s Pakistan’s decision-makers remained fundamentally unsatisfied about 
the disputed status of Kashmir (Khan 1967, 122-8). They argued that Kashmir, as a predominantly 
Muslim territory, had to merge with Pakistan to complete Pakistan’s distinctive identity (Ibid.). This is 
characterized by the post-war statement of the Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto: ‘[i]f a Muslim 
identity can remain a part of India, then the raison d’etre of Pakistan collapses. […] It would be fatal if 
[…] Pakistan were to abandon the struggle [on Kashmir]’ (Bhutto 1969). Concurrently, India showed 
resolve on Kashmir in this conflict too, as Kashmir, being predominantly Muslim, was the shining 
example of India’s secular qualifications (Kumar 2013, 70).  
The 1965 conflict has also been characterized by Pakistani chauvinist mythmaking. In an anti-
Indian fashion, Pakistani President Khan wrote on India’s intentions before the 1965 conflict: ‘Indian 
efforts in the field of foreign policy were all directed at one aim, the isolation of Pakistan and its 
disintegration’ (Khan 1967, 117). At the same time, Pakistan created the self-glorifying myth that the 
1965 conflict ended in a Pakistani victory, in order to counter Indian claims and shield the Khan-regime 
from criticism (Imtiaz 2015).  
Irredentism. The 1965 conflict shows strong evidence for the role of irredentism. Aiming to 
instigate a Kashmiri rebellion with its incursions, Pakistan hoped that it would finally bring a favorable 
conclusion to the Kashmir issue (Ganguly 2001, 40). Again, one of the most distinct voices of this 
irredentist sentiment was Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto (Ibid. 32). During the 1964-5 Pakistani 
Presidential election campaign, he stated: ‘Pakistan is incomplete without Jammu and Kashmir both 
territorially and ideologically.’ (Ibid.). Moreover, Bhutto promised ‘retaliatory steps [in the near future] 
to counter the Indian attempt to merge the occupied parts of Kashmir with India’ (Mansfield and 
Snyder 2005, 243). To this, he added the clear irredentist claim that ‘Kashmir must be liberated if 
Pakistan is to have its full meaning’ (Ibid.). President Khan, who would win reelection, followed 
Bhutto’s lead in using the Kashmir issue to generate popular enthusiasm for his presidency, paving the 
way for the 1965 conflict (Ibid.). 
 
False optimism 
Particular power asymmetry. The 1965 armed conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir can 
be explained by Indo-Pakistani power asymmetry (Paul 1994). On the eve of the 1965 armed conflict, 
India’s military advantage against Pakistan was a staggering 8.5:1 (see Figure 1) (Paul 1994, 107-25). 
Nevertheless, Pakistan initiated this armed conflict (Ibid.). All four conditions of Paul’s (1994, 20) 
theory of asymmetric conflicts were present. The Pakistani leadership planned this armed conflict as a 
limited aims strategy, believing that achieving territorial and political objectives in a short operation 
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would strengthen their negotiation position on Kashmir (Ibid. 110-4). Moreover, Pakistan had recently 
acquired sufficient offensive capabilities for a short war on Kashmir (Ibid. 115-7). Because of India’s 
army modernization efforts after the 1962 Sino-Indian War, waiting would have been to Pakistan’s 
disadvantage (Ibid. 115-7). Concurrently, related to factor (V), the alliance structure had shifted in 
Pakistan’s favor (Ibid. 170-120). After the 1962 Sino-Indian War, China allied itself with Pakistan to 
counter Indian power in the region and to divert Indian military attention away from China (Curtis 
2009). Likewise, Pakistan expected the US not to interfere, because of its focus on Indochina (Paul 
1994, 117-20). Due to the Sino-Indian War of 1962, in which two Soviet allies had fought, the USSR 
took a neutralist position towards the Indo-Pakistani conflict, supporting India less than before (Gupta 
1981, 223). Lastly, related to factor (IV), the arrival of Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs Bhutto, who 
took a more hawkish attitude on Kashmir, into the decision-making structure, caused significant 
change (Ibid. 120-2). As mentioned above, his staunch bellicose rhetoric on Kashmir influenced 
President Khan’s later decision to start the 1965 conflict (Aziz 2009, 39). This all culminated in 
Pakistan’s 1965 false optimism leading to war over Kashmir. 
Domestic power structures. Domestic power structures can explain the 1965 Indo-Pakistani 
conflict as well. In 1960, a hybrid regime came to power in Pakistan under former-general, President 
Khan (Tremblay and Schofield 2005, 231-2). India’s defeat against China in 1962 became an irresistible 
window of opportunity for Pakistan’s militarized institutions (Ibid.). A territorial dispute in early 1965 
on the Rann of Kutch, a remote desert border area, which was won by an India that showed little 
willingness to fight, inspired the hybrid Pakistani regime to set in motion plans to start the 1965 Indo-
Pakistani War on Kashmir (Ibid.). It is unlikely that a democratic or military regime would have 
escalated a conflict on such remote and strategically marginal issues (Ibid.). Only for the domestic 
nationalist value of a confrontation with India, Pakistan’s hybrid regime engaged in these hostilities 
(Ibid.). Likewise, Pakistan’s domestic power structure enabled the 1965 conflict to be planned without 
the consultation of the army generals, who likely would have rejected the plan, causing this conflict to 
materialize (Ibid.).  
Great power involvement. In contrast to the 1947-8 conflict, the 1965 conflict was shaped by 
great power involvement. After the 1947-8 conflict, a convergence of US and Pakistani interests 
produced a strategic alliance to contain India’s potential economic and military hegemony of the South 
Asian region (Kapur 2005, 138). However, in the beginning of the 1960s, US interest began to wane as 
a result of its preoccupation in Indochina (Paul 1994, 119). Pakistani leaders, therefore, believed that 
the US would remain neutral if it launched an offensive on Kashmir (Ibid.). Nevertheless, the US did 
supply arms to Pakistan in these years as a result of their patron-client relation (US Department of 
State 2017).  
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Due to the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Chinese and Pakistani relations strengthened significantly 
(Paul 1994, 118). Since partition, China tried to balance against India’s potential rise in three ways: (I) 
it attacked India’s prestige regionally and internationally through war, (II) it sought Indo-Pakistani arms 
balance, and, (III) it pursued an active anti-India policy (Kapur 2005, 134). Consequently, the Pakistani 
leadership believed that should Pakistan become involved in a war with India, China would fight along 
Pakistan (Ibid.). Yet, China merely supplied Pakistan with arms during the 1965 conflict (Alam 2012, 
27).  
Another great power that became increasingly interested in South Asia was the USSR. At that 
time, South Asia was geographically important to the Soviet Union because (a) India-China 
rapprochement against the USSR would harm Soviet interests; and (b) the spread of Chinese influence 
to the Middle East through Pakistan could affect the Soviet position in the area (Kapur 2005, 134). To 
that extent, the USSR supplied weapons to India (US Department of State 2017). As a result of the 1962 
Sino-Indian War, the USSR signaled that they would remain neutral in the event of an Indo-Pakistani 
conflict (Paul 1994, 119). Therefore, Pakistani decision-makers believed that the USSR would not get 
involved if war would break out (Ibid.). These favorable calculations on great power involvement 
contributed to Pakistan’s false optimism that a limited war with India on Kashmir could be won, 
resulting in the 1965 armed conflict. 
 
4.2.3 Conclusion 
Like in the 1947-8 conflict, again, two driving factors can explain the overall hostility between India 
and Pakistan at the onset of the 1965 conflict, which are (I) incompatible Indo-Pakistani identities 
and Pakistani (II) irredentism. Next to these driving causes, Pakistan’s decision to start this conflict 
was augmented by false optimism. This false optimism was triggered by all three enabling factors: 
(III) particular power asymmetry, (IV) domestic power structures, and by (V) great power 
involvement. However, here, factors (IV) and (V) were most significant in enabling the Pakistani 
leadership to decide to wage war on Kashmir in 1965. 
 
4.3 1999 conflict 
4.3.1 Conflict explanation 
Since Bangladeshi independence from Pakistan in 1971, for many years, South Asia saw a period of 
relative peace (Syed 1992; Ganguly 2001, 79). Nevertheless, in 1999, India and Pakistan almost 
plunged into another full-scale war on Kashmir again (Ibid. 114). On routine patrol in the Kargil sector 
of the LoC, the Indian army discovered that hundreds of Pakistani troops had intruded into Indian 
Kashmir, occupying a number of strategic positions (Ibid. 115-6). Eventually, assisted by Indian Air 
Force bombardments, Indian forces managed to recapture the lost territory (Ibid. 117-8). Facing 
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escalating losses and little international diplomatic support, the Pakistani leadership was forced to 
reconsider continuing its military operations (Ibid. 120). Finally, after a couple of weeks, the conflict 
came to a close (Ibid. 120).  
 
4.3.2 Which factors caused the 1999 conflict?  
Parallel to the 1947-8 and 1965 conflicts, answering which factors explain the Pakistani decision to go 
to war with India in the 1999 conflict is complex. Nonetheless, I will try to analyze whether the five 
hypothesized factors can explain this conflict between India and Pakistan. 
 
Overall state of hostility 
Incompatible national identities. The 1999 conflict is rooted in incompatible Indo-Pakistani identities. 
Since Bangladeshi independence, Pakistan’s Islamic communalist discourse of forming one union had 
failed (Nasr 2005, 183). This development caused Pakistan to begin to draw on a more fundamentalist 
kind of Islamism to define its national identity (Ibid.). From envisioning itself as the homeland of 
Muslims on the Indian subcontinent, Pakistan increasingly tried to become the embodiment of the 
Islamic ideal as defined by Islamism (Ibid.). Islamism in Pakistan is anti-Indian in rejecting India’s 
secularism and Hindu domination (Ibid. 184). Islamism has also been used by the Pakistani military to 
legitimize military rule in Pakistan, resulting in prolonging the Kashmir issue and highlighting the Indian 
threat (Kumar 2013, 70; Nasr 2005, 191). Since the 1980s, Islamist and anti-Indian images also found 
its way in the Pakistani textbooks and curricula, which, according to Jalal (1995, 78) are the best 
examples of Pakistani mythmaking. A 1995 primary education textbook notes: ‘[r]egard Pakistan as an 
Islamic state, and acquire deep love for it’ (Nayyar and Salim 2005, 11). From an Urdu textbook from 
the same time, a clear example of an anti-Indian myth can be found, stating: ‘[the] Hindu has always 
been an enemy of Islam’ (Ibid. 20). These textbooks also aim to promote militarism in Pakistani society, 
containing myths glorifying war and the military, while introducing courses like ‘Fundamentals of War’ 
in intermediate classes (Ibid. 77-8).  
Irredentism. The 1999 conflict shows signs of irredentism. Irredentist feelings had subsided in 
India and Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s, after, with Bangladeshi independence, it was demonstrated 
that Pakistan could not keep its nation united on the basis of religion alone (Ganguly 2001, 5-7). By the 
same token, India’s normative claim to Kashmir began to erode too, as its secularism declined. At the 
same time, Indian efforts to alleviate the living conditions in Indian Kashmir paid off, resulting in 
diminished violence and a relaxation of intra-Kashmir tensions (Saideman 2005, 217). Nevertheless, 
Pakistan instigated the 1999 armed conflict to derail India’s accomplishments in the area (Ibid.). 
Clearly, Pakistan started these efforts in order to thwart the solidifying India-favoring status quo on 
Kashmir (Ibid.). Yet, without having officially declared war against India on Kashmir, as it had done 
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before, Pakistan seemed to lack as strong irredentist feelings and unwavering resolve to change the 
status quo on Kashmir (Ibid.). Nonetheless, addressing the 1999 Kargil conflict, Pakistani Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif, spoke out with the irredentist notion: ‘I want to declare that the Kashmiri urge 
for freedom cannot be stifled by force. The Kashmiri people's struggle will continue. […] [Pakistan] will 
never abandon the Kashmiris’ (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2017). 
 
False optimism 
Particular power asymmetry. Pakistani false optimism in the 1999 conflict can be explained by Paul’s 
(1994) theory of asymmetric conflicts. While India held a 6:1 military advantage (see Figure 1), the 
Kargil incursions by Pakistani forces can be characterized as a limited aims strategy: using covert forces 
to test India’s will to fight (Ganguly 2001, 121). This limited attack, with the ability to still be able to 
reverse course, made the risks for Pakistan both calculable and controllable, while it could also 
challenge the status quo on Kashmir (Ibid.). Before the onset of the Kargil War, the international 
community pressured India and Pakistan to improve their relationship and a successful dialogue on 
reducing tensions started (Ibid. 114). However, the Pakistani military, fearing that the Kashmir issue 
would be resolved in the ongoing talks, felt the need to use this chance to plan a military operation 
that would revive the Kashmir issue on the international agenda (Ibid. 115). At the same time, tied to 
factor (V), Pakistan’s decision-makers assumed that the international community would find it difficult 
to accurately pin responsibility of the attack on Pakistan, because of the covert nature of the Pakistani 
incursions of the LoC (Ibid.). Likewise, Pakistan also assumed that the US would not support the Indian 
position, due to its longtime alliance with Pakistan (Ibid.). These assumptions turned out to be false as 
the US ended up actively denouncing Pakistani aggression, while China, Pakistan’s other main ally, 
remained neutral (Ibid. 115; Mahapatra 1999; Singh 1999). Furthermore, tied to factor (IV), Mr. 
Musharraf’s October 1998 appointment as Pakistani Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee 
enabled the Kargil War to materialize (Chitkara 2001, 135-6). Since the beginning of the 1990s, 
Musharraf, in his role as Director General of Military operations of Pakistan, had been refining the 
Kargil plan, and proposing it to the Pakistani leadership (Kapur 2007, 117-8). Nevertheless, these plans 
for a Kargil incursion were rebuffed by the Pakistani leadership time after time (Ibid.). Finally, with 
Musharraf’s promotion, preparations for the Kargil incursion were able to commence (Chitkara 2001, 
135-6; Kapur 2007, 117-8).  
Domestic power structures. This conflict also was largely the result of Pakistan’s hybrid regime. 
After the late 1980s, Islamist state ideology came to influence Pakistan’s interventionist foreign policy 
on Kashmir under the Prime Ministers Bhutto (1993-6) and Sharif (1997-9) (Tremblay and Schofield 
2005, 233). The persistent threat of a coup, which finally occurred after the 1999 conflict with India, 
provided the Pakistani military with enough autonomy to plan and execute military operation without 
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civilian control (Ibid.). Therefore, the 1999 conflict over Kashmir was largely the result of a Pakistani 
hybrid government composed of Prime Minister Sharif, Islamists, and military interests, all focused on 
Kashmir (Ibid.). Just before the outbreak of the 1999 conflict, Prime Minister Sharif attempted to put 
the president’s and military’s power under civilian control and oversight (Banerjee and Hosur 2015, 
69). In order to counter these developments, the Pakistani army used the 1999 conflict as a policy 
instrument to outmaneuver civilian leaders to regain its lost power (Ibid.).  
Great power involvement. Pakistan’s false optimist at the start of the 1999 conflict was only 
partly shaped by great power involvement. The Pakistani military devised the Kargil plan to revive the 
Kashmir issue on the international agenda (Ganguly 2001, 115). The Pakistani leadership believed that 
the US would remain neutral and that China would publicly support Pakistan in the event of war 
breaking out in Kashmir (Ibid.). This belief stemmed from Pakistan’s assessment of past behavior of 
great powers in the Indo-Pakistani conflicts (Ibid.). However, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
end of the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1980s, the strategic importance of Pakistan for 
the US began to wane; therefore, the US actively denounced Pakistani aggression in the 1999 conflict 
(Ibid. 115; Ganguly 2016, 41; Mahapatra 1999; Singh 1999). Concurrently, China remained neutral, 
although it did supply Pakistan with military aid (Curtis 2009).  
 
4.3.3 Conclusion 
Like the previous conflicts, two driving factors explain the overall hostility between India and Pakistan 
at the onset of the 1999 conflict, which are (I) incompatible Indo-Pakistani identities and (II) Pakistani 
irredentist nationalism on Kashmir. Next to these driving causes, Pakistan’s decision to start war with 
India on Kashmir was increased by its false optimism. The most significant enabling factor in explaining 
the 1999 conflict was a change in Pakistan’s (IV) domestic power structure, which led Pakistan to 
believe that it could win a limited war with India. The enabling factors (III) particular power asymmetry 
between India and Pakistan, and partly (V) great power involvement contributed to Pakistan’s false 
optimism. 
 
4.4 2001-2 conflict 
4.4.1 Conflict explanation 
Late 2001, armed terrorists, with links to Pakistan-based terrorist organizations Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) 
and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), attacked the Indian parliament (Ganguly 2016, 64-5). As a result of 
this attack, the Hindu-nationalist BJP-led Indian government mobilized its armed forces against 
Pakistan (Ibid. 65-6; Singh 2006, 266). As Indian mobilization took some three weeks, Pakistan had 
ample opportunity to reinforce its own defenses (Ganguly 2016, 66-7). During India’s mobilization, 
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Pakistan also banned a number of terrorist organizations, denouncing their actions and their use of 
Pakistani territory (Ibid. 67-8). The ensuing Indo-Pakistani standoff, which culminated along the LoC 
in Kashmir and saw a number of casualties, heightened tensions significantly (Ibid.). As a 
consequence of US diplomatic intervention, the crisis slowly wound down (Ibid. 71-2).  
 
4.4.2 Which factors caused the 2001-2 conflict?  
After all these years, without ever having changed the status quo with India, it is interesting that 
Pakistan still had not abandoned its intransigence in fighting war against India. Nevertheless, for the 
2001-2 Indo-Pakistani conflict, I will analyze whether the five hypothesized factors can explain this 
conflict between India and Pakistan. 
 
Overall state of hostility 
Incompatible national identities. The enduring overall hostility between India and Pakistan at the onset 
of the 2001-2 conflict stems from incompatible Indo-Pakistani identities. During the 1980s and 1990s, 
Pakistan’s identity has become increasingly Islamist (Nasr 2005, 199). In order to keep the Kashmir 
issue flared up and to find a new preoccupation for growing Pakistani radicalism, the Pakistani military 
encouraged jihadi terrorists to become active in India and Kashmir (Ibid.). Pakistan’s support for jihadi 
Pakistani and Kashmiri groups led to the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, which was the 
prelude to the 2001-2 armed conflict (Ibid.). The support of Pakistan’s military and intelligence services 
to the terrorist organizations perpetrating the Indian parliamentary attack was so significant, that one 
can speak of state-sponsored terrorism (Wolf 2017, 117-20). There is credible evidence that the 
Pakistani intelligence agency, the ISI, was at least involved in training and arming the terrorists (Ibid. 
136). This is supported by the fact that the perpetrators were fighters from LeT and JeM, two 
organizations who maintain close links with the ISI (Ibid.). 
Textbooks from around the time of the 2001-2 conflict again show clear Islamist and anti-
Indian images (Nayyar and Salim 2005). Since the 1980s, Pakistani textbooks of compulsory subjects 
openly praised jihad and urged students to become mujahideen and martyrs (Ibid. 87). At the same 
time, in a textbook on social studies from 2002, one can read about the ‘the social evils of the Hindus’ 
– a clear anti-Indian myth (Ibid. 20). This indicates that Pakistan at that time defined itself through 
staunch Islamism and anti-Indianism.  
Irredentism. The 2001-2 Indo-Pakistani conflict can also be explained by irredentism. After the 
1999 conflict, Pakistani decision-makers remained reluctant to abandon their claims to Kashmir or part 
with their strategy of asymmetric war against India (Ganguly 2016, 53). This is illustrated by Pakistani 
President Musharraf’s 2002 claim that: ‘Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever 
links with Kashmir. […] We will continue to extend our moral, political and diplomatic support to 
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Kashmiris. We will never budge an inch from our principle stand on Kashmir’ (New York Times 2002). 
The stated intent of the terrorist forces supported by Pakistan was to attack India and to reclaim 
Kashmir, this was too the reason why Pakistan supported these groups so elaborately (Wolf 2017, 136). 
This indicates that this conflict is influenced by irredentism.   
 
False optimism 
Particular power asymmetry. At the onset of the 2001-2 conflict, Pakistani false optimism in supporting 
terrorist groups to keep the Kashmir issue alive, can to some degree be explained by Paul’s (1994) 
theory of asymmetric conflicts. While India held an 8:1 military advantage (see Figure 1), Pakistan 
envisioned the use of a limited aims strategy to test Indian military resolve by using terrorist forces 
(Ganguly 2016, 53). In that way, it hoped to be able to deny its involvement (Ganguly 2016, 53). 
Pakistan intended to make use of a window of opportunity, as there is a correlation between this 
terrorist attack and Indo-Pakistani peace talks of mid-2001 (Wolf 2017, 136; Pande 2016). Because the 
Pakistani army did not support this development, it engaged with Pakistan-based terrorist groups in 
keeping pressure on Kashmir (Ibid. 53-4). At first glance, the timing seemed peculiar (Pande 2004). At 
this time, just a couple of months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City, the US and other 
major great powers were poised to battle terrorism (Ibid.). Nevertheless, parallel to factor (V), 
Pakistani decision-makers rightfully predicted that having terrorist groups on their soil would gain 
them military, economic and political support from the US to combat terrorism (Ibid.). Furthermore, 
in line with factor (IV), Musharraf became the Chief-Executive of Pakistan after the 1999 military coup 
(Raman 2001). From this moment onwards, he covertly started supporting terrorists to achieve 
Pakistan's strategic objective in destabilizing India and to keep the Kashmir issue alive (Ibid.).  
  Domestic power structures. The 2001-2 Indo-Pakistani conflict has been influenced by 
domestic power structures. Although this attack was not perpetrated by regular Pakistani forces, the 
terrorists that committed the attack were supported and facilitated by the Pakistani regime (Ganguly 
2016, 64-6). Although Pakistan has long been accused of sponsoring terrorism, the 1999 Pakistani 
military coup, which led the Pakistani military to govern the country again, accelerated this 
development (Wolf 2017, 120-48). As mentioned above, after the 1999 conflict, Pakistan’s militarism 
made it unresponsive to external pressures to abandon its enmity towards India (Ganguly 2016, 63-4). 
The Pakistani army showed little willingness to scale down its strategy of using asymmetric, terrorist, 
forces to destabilize India and Indian Kashmir (Ibid.). In fact, Pakistan’s military accession to power, 
influenced by Islamist and irredentist forces, motivated it to increase the use of such forces (Ibid.). This 
formed the groundworks of the 2001-2 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament culminating eventually 
in the border crisis (Ibid.).  
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Great power involvement. Pakistan’s false optimist in supporting anti-Indian terrorist groups 
was only marginally shaped by great power involvement. As a result of the 1999 conflict, Pakistan did 
not enjoy a warm relationship with the US, thus receiving no arms supplies (Alam 2012, 51). 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, having terrorist forces on their soil, eventually would gain Pakistan 
military, economic and political support from the US (Pande 2004). Indeed, after 2001, the US-Pakistan 
relationship improved, boosting US arms supplies to Pakistan to battle terrorism (Alam 2012, 51).  
 
4.4.3 Conclusion 
Again, two driving factors can explain the overall hostility between India and Pakistan at the onset of 
the 1999 conflict, which are (I) incompatible Indo-Pakistani identities and (II) Pakistani irredentist 
nationalism on Kashmir. Next to these driving causes, Pakistan’s decision to support terrorist forces 
was augmented by Pakistani false optimism This false optimism was mainly caused by the enabling 
factor (IV) domestic power structures, although factor (III) particular power asymmetry, also had some 
influence. Factor (V) great power involvement only marginally enabled this false optimism. 
 
4.5 Discussion  
In analyzing non-nuclear factors explaining Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence, I found that all five 
hypothesized factors – to a greater or lesser extent – have influenced Indo-Pakistani conflict 
occurrence over time. Here, I have discerned between driving and enabling factors, and found the 
following mechanism. Two driving causes explain the overall state of hostility between India and 
Pakistan, namely (I) incompatible national identities and (II) irredentism. However, as both driving 
factors have been present at a comparable level over time, by themselves they cannot satisfyingly 
explain when conflict will break out. Explanations for specific occurrences have been different levels 
of enabling factors, augmenting false optimism in starting the various conflicts. In this analysis on the 
Indo-Pakistani conflict three enabling factors have been defined: (III) particular power asymmetry, (IV) 
domestic power structures, and, (V) great power involvement. I argue that, if the driving factors remain 
at a comparable level, it is not only the presence of enabling factors, but also a significant change in 
one of these enabling factors that cause Indo-Pakistani conflict. Most often, this has been change in 
Pakistan’s domestic power structure. The results per conflict are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence.  
Factors that show significant change just prior to conflict occurring are both bold and underscored. 
 T1 (1947 – late 1980s) T2 (late 1980s – present) 
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 Conflict 1 
(1947-8) 
Conflict 2 
(1965) 
Conflict 3 
(1999) 
Conflict 4 
(2001-2) 
X1: Incompatible national 
identities 
Yes, driving 
factor 
Yes, driving 
factor 
Yes, driving 
factor 
Yes, driving 
factor 
X2: Irredentism Yes, driving 
factor 
Yes, driving 
factor 
Yes, driving 
factor 
Yes, driving 
factor 
X3: Particular power 
asymmetry 
Yes Yes Yes Yes, influenced 
X4: Domestic power 
structures 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
X5: Great power involvement No Yes Yes, partly No, only 
marginally  
Ydependent: Conflict occurrence Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Conflict characteristics 
(initiator; type) 
Pakistan; open 
invasion of 
Kashmir 
Pakistan; 
covert 
invasion of 
Kashmir 
Pakistan; 
covert 
invasion of 
Kashmir 
Pakistan; 
covert support 
of terrorist 
attack on India 
 
Consequently, this approach could pose a tool to assess the risk of future Indo-Pakistani 
conflict occurrence by carefully analyzing the state of affairs and interplay of the three enabling factors. 
Nonetheless, a number of limitations have shown during the analysis. Although derived from reputable 
literature (Paul 2005), the chosen set of factors partially overlaps, thereby complicating the analysis. 
As mentioned earlier, driving factor (II) can be seen as an extreme materialization of driving factor (I). 
In the analysis, enabling factor (III) has been assessed based on the four conditions from earlier work 
of Paul (1994). These conditions are (1) a limited aims strategy, (2) a window of opportunity, (3) great 
power support, and, (4) changing domestic power structures (see also paragraph 2.2.3). This creates 
partial overlap when assessing the enabling factors (IV) and (V). I propose future analysis to counter 
this overlap in the following manner. Condition 4 of factor (III) could be defined as a change in domestic 
power structures, while factor (IV) would entail different domestic power structures. Moreover, 
condition 3 of factor (III) could cover a shift in alliance structures, while condition (V) could be defined 
as great power verbal and material involvement. These shifted definitions of the enabling factors will 
pose a clearer and less overlapping framework for explaining Indo-Pakistani conflict, while addressing 
the change related aspects of the enabling factors more explicitly under (III) particular power 
asymmetry. 
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As the five hypothesized factors have caused Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence in the above-
described manner, little evidence has been found of the influence of nuclear weapons on Indo-
Pakistani conflict occurrence in the nuclear era. Conflicts have occurred both before and after nuclear 
weapons were present, while, when looking to conflict characteristics (see Table 2), no clear shift in 
how conflicts occur has been observed. This supports my starting assumption on the limitations of 
deterrence theory to the Indo-Pakistani situation. Before and during the nuclear era, Pakistan has been 
the initiator of conflict, initiation both covert and open military operations against India. This supports 
my starting assumption on the limitations of deterrence theory to the Indo-Pakistani situation. 
Nevertheless, as a result of my research design, I have not been able to analyze the influence of nuclear 
weapons on the enabling factors. Here, especially impact on the (perception of) (III) particular power 
asymmetry could be expected.  
  
5. Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have answered the following research question: ‘Which factors explain conflict 
occurrence between India and Pakistan beyond deterrence theory?’. In order to do so, general theories 
on conflict occurrence have been looked into, which have been projected on four selected Indo-
Pakistani conflict occurrences, two in the pre-nuclear era and two in the nuclear era. This has been to 
ascertain whether or not deterrence theory is able to explain Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence. The 
following hypothesis has been formulated: due to factors as (I) incompatible national identities; (II) 
irredentism; (III) particular power asymmetry; (IV) domestic power structures; and (V) great power 
involvement, conflict has occurred between India and Pakistan over time. 
To get to these five factors, I have combined Ganguly’s (2001, 4-8) and Paul’s (2005, 21) 
arguments. This is done in order to bridge Ganguly’s mechanism of driving and enabling factors with 
Paul’s more comprehensive list of factors explaining Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence. Here, my 
results refine existing theories on Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence.  
 In my analysis, I have found that the hypothesized five factors, when linked, are able to explain 
conflict occurrence between India and Pakistan. Two driving causes, namely (I) incompatible national 
identities and (II) Pakistani irredentism, explain the overall state of hostility between India and 
Pakistan. However, as they have stayed at a comparable level over time, by themselves they cannot 
satisfyingly explain when conflict will break out. Explanations for specific occurrences have been 
changes in enabling factors, that augmented Pakistani false optimism in starting the various conflicts. 
In the Indo-Pakistani conflict three enabling factors have been discussed: (III) particular power 
asymmetry, (IV) domestic power structures, and, (V) great power involvement. So, I argue that it is not 
just the presence of enabling factors, but also a significant change in one of these that will cause Indo-
Pakistani conflict to occur. Mainly, this has been change in Pakistan’s domestic power structure. This 
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is a clear indication that there is no reason to believe that nuclear weapons have had an explanatory 
role in Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence. No obvious shift in conflict characteristics has been observed 
after entering the nuclear era either. 
  
Recommendations 
In the discussion, I have identified the following arguments that could improve future analysis of Indo-
Pakistani conflict occurrence. First, reduce the existing overlap in the analysis between the enabling 
factors by improving their definitions, starting from Paul’s (1994) four conditions of factor (III) 
particular power asymmetry (as described in paragraph 4.5). This will especially improve the analysis 
of change related aspects of the enabling factors. Second, further investigate the possible impact of 
nuclear weapons on the enabling factors, especially on (III) particular power asymmetry, as nuclear 
weapons could bridge power asymmetry. Third, further examine to what extent the presence of 
nuclear weapons has changed the character of the conflicts as listed in Table 2, thereby identifying 
whether the type of the conflicts has changed. Four, within this thesis and based on empirical evidence, 
the levels of the driving factors are assessed to be comparable over time. It would be valuable to 
confirm this by a further detailed study on the driving factors. Implementing these recommendations 
would bring refinements into my analysis of Indo-Pakistani conflict occurrence, which, in turn, might 
provide stakeholders with some instruments to prevent conflict from re-occurring between India and 
Pakistan in the future.  
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